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Abstract 
Cloud computing has been regarded as the technology enabler for the Internet of Things (IoT). To ensure the most 
effective collection of IoT-based evidence, it is vital for forensic practitioners to possess a contemporary 
understanding of the artefacts from different cloud services. In this paper, we seek to determine the data remnants 
from the use of BitTorrent Sync version 2.0. Findings from our research using mobile and computer devices running 
Windows 8.1, Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, iOS 7.1.2, and Android KitKat 4.4.4 suggested 
that artefacts relating to the installation, uninstallation, log-in, log-off, and file synchronisation could be recovered, 
which are potential sources of IoT forensics. We also present a forensically sound investigation methodology for 
BitTorrent Sync. 
Keywords: Internet of Things Forensics; Cloud Forensics; P2P Cloud Investigation; Computer Forensics; Mobile 
Forensics; Bittorrent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1. Introduction 
The Internet of things (IoT) has been the focus of researchers and practitioners in recent years, due to the 
increasing popularity of internet connected devices. Gartner (2014a) forecasted the number of IoT devices to reach 
26 billion by 2019. Similarly, the International Data Corporation (IDC) (2014) predicted that the IoT devices to hit 
30 billion by 2020, amounting to USD3.04 trillion. Since the IoT devices are equipped with low storage and 
computational capability (Zawoad, 2015), the IDC (2014a) predicted that 90% of all IoT data will be hosted on 
cloud service provider platforms by 2019 as cloud computing reduces the complexity of supporting IoT data 
blending.  
Although cloud computing is often being credited for enabling promising and cost-competitive storage 
solutions for the IoT, it is subject to potential abuse by both traditional and cyber miscreants in the meantime (Choo, 
2008). Potential crimes related to cloud computing include information theft (Choo, 2010; Symantec, 2011; Duke, 
2014), malicious software distribution (Shado, 2014), denial of service attacks (DDoS) (Lemos, 2010; Peterson, 
2013), industrial espionage, copyright infringement, and storage of illegal materials (e.g. child exploitation 
materials, and terrorism materials).  
 Since a public cloud storage infrastructure may constitute cloud servers located in one or more data centers 
and jurisdictions, the forensic community is often subject to various legal challenges (Taylor et al., 2011; Chung et 
al 2012; Grispos, Storer, and Glisson, 2013; Hooper, Martini, and Choo, 2013; NIST, 2014; Quick et al., 2014a; 
Martini and Choo 2014a). Even in the event that the evidence could be identified, it would not be trivial to seize the 
storage media (server) as it is likely to hold data belonging to other users (e.g. in a multi-tenancy cloud environment) 
(ENISA, 2012).  
Due to the rapid advancement of the IoT, it is imperative that forensic examiners are cognisant of the 
different types of cloud products as well as an up-to-date understanding of the potential artefacts that could 
potentially be recovered to inform the IoT investigations (Hale, 2013; Quick and Choo, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Martini 
and Choo, 2014c; Quick et al., 2014). Depending on the cloud storage solution in use, the client device can often 
provide potential for alternative methods for recovery of the cloud artefacts (Farina et al., 2014; Scanlon et al., 
2014a; Scanlon et al., 2014b; Scanlon et al., 2015). Hence, in this paper, we seek to identify potential terrestrial 
artefacts that may remain after the use of the newer BitTorrent Sync version 2.0. Similar to the approaches of Quick 
and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2014), we attempt to answer the following questions in this research: 
1. Does the act of file download or file upload using BitTorrent Sync cloud storage alter the file contents and 
timestamps of the original files? 
2. What data can be found on a computer hard drive and memory after a user has used the BitTorrent Sync 
client application and web application, and the location of data remnants on Windows 8.1, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS 
(Ubuntu), and Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 (Mac OS)? 
3. What data remains on an Apple iPhone 4 running iOS version 7.1.2 (iOS) and HTC One X running 
Android Kit Kat 4.4.4 (Android) mobile devices after a user has used the BitTorrent Sync client apps? 
4. What data can be seen in network traffic? 
We regard the contribution of this paper to be two-fold: 
1. To provide the forensic community an in-depth understanding of the types of terrestrial artefacts that are 
likely to remain after the use of the newer BitTorrent Sync cloud applications. 
2. An operational methodology to guide forensic practitioners in examining the latest BitTorrent Sync 
applications. 
This paper is organised as follows. The background is provided in Section 2. In Section 3, we provide an overview 
of the research methodology including the cloud investigative framework used and the experiment setup. In Section 
4 and 5, we detail the findings from the technical experiments involving the personal computers and mobile devices. 
Section 6 discusses the network artefacts. We outline our proposed operational methodology for BitTorrent Sync 
forensics in Section 7. Finally, we conclude the paper and outline potential future research topics in Section 8. 
 2. Background 
BitTorrent Sync is a product built by BitTorrent Inc., the creator of the BitTorrent P2P file sharing protocol 
(BitTorrent Inc., 2015b). BitTorrent Sync allows file hosting and sharing across multiple platforms such as 
Windows, Mac OS, Linux, Android, iOS, and Windows mobile OS (BitTorrent, 2014). Other than the free space on 
a sync device, the fully p2p-based architecture does not limit the amount of data that can be synced. Hence, it is not 
surprising that it becomes a popular choice for file replication and synchronisation. For example, in less than two 
years after its release, the number of BitTorrent Sync users is reportedly over 10 million and the application had 
transferred over 80 Petabytes of data as of August 2014 (Pounds, 2014). The users are required to install the client 
application to use the service. For the Linux client application, the service is only accessible through 
‘http://localhost:8888’ and the web interface is password protected. 
2.1 Device and folder sharing 
BitTorrent Sync users are required to create a private identity for the first device running BitTorrent Sync 
2.0 or later. The identity holds the user name (provided by the user), device name, identity-specific certificate 
fingerprint, and a 33-digit key created using a public key infrastructure. The key contains the folder permissions 
used to establish connections with other devices and for licensing purposes (BitTorrent Inc., 2015f). Only a private 
identity is required for all connected/linked devices. 
When a user adds a new folder to BitTorrent Sync, the user automatically becomes the owner of that folder. 
Other than devices sharing the same private identity, BitTorrent Sync permits the users to share folders with a device 
that has a different identity. The folder sharing is facilitated by a sync link (introduced in BitTorrent Sync version 
1.4), which can be shared as a HTTPS link or QR code and contains the following details: 
 Shared folder name (prefixed with ‘f=’),  
 an approximation of the folder size in exponential format (prefixed with ‘sz=’), 
 a 20-byte folder ID in base32 encoding (prefixed with ‘s=’), 
 a temporary key (formerly known as ‘one-time secret’) in base32 encoding (prefixed with ‘i=’), 
 link expiration time (prefixed with ‘e=’),  
 and a base32-encoded peer ID (prefixed with ‘p=’) used to identify which of 2 peers is going to take a role 
of a server during key negotiation (BitTorrent Inc., 2015d).  
BitTorrent Sync allows the users to configure the expiry time for the sync link (three days by default), a limit on the 
number of uses of the sync link, as well as the authorisation settings during folder sharing (BitTorrent Inc., 2015e). 
When a sync link is shared from host to guest, the guest responds the host with the temporary key 
(contained within the sync link shared by the host) followed by a request containing the locally generated X.509 
certificate (which contains the public key fingerprint, owner's name, and device name), allowing the host to validate 
the identity of the requester (guest) before sending the actual master key. 
A standard master key constitutes capital letters from A to Z and numbers from 2 to 7; the first letter of a 
key represents its type (See Table 1) while the remaining is a 20-byte sequence (usually 32 symbols) in base32 
format, with the exception of the ‘Read-Only’ (RO) key which is twice as long (65 symbols), holding an additional 
data encryption/decryption key (BitTorrent Inc., 2015c). Folders shared with a ‘Read & Write’ (RW) permission 
provide the peers the ability to add new files/folders or modify/remove the existing ones, and synchronise the 
changes to all the peer devices. On the other hand, modifications made to the shared folders with a RO permission 
will not be synchronised to other corresponding devices. All the BitTorrent Sync keys are generated using ED25519 
and SHA3 cryptographic algorithms (BitTorrent Inc., 2015a). 
Table 1: Key types (BitTorrent Inc., 2015c).  
Key type Uses 
A Standard key with read-write permission. 
B Read-only key derived from the ‘A’-type key. 
C Time-limited read-only one-time key derived from the ‘A’ or ‘B’-type key.  
D Standard key with read-write permission capable to seed data to encrypted nodes. 
E Read-only key derived from the ‘D’-type key which provides the ability to get and decrypt data from encrypted nodes (nodes 
 with ‘D’ and ‘F’ types of key). 
F Encrypted key derived from the ‘E’ or ‘F’-type key which provides the ability to receive, store and seed data, but cannot decrypt 
filenames or content. 
R Obsolete Read-only key generated by pre-1.0 version. This key is still in use for compatibility purposes. 
2.2 Data transfers 
To initiate download of a shared folder, the guest must first download the metainfo (.TORRENT) file from 
the host. The guest then interprets the metainfo file for the folder metadata as well as tracker URL (or IP address and 
port combinations), and uses the details to locate peers actively participating in the particular swarm
1
 or sharing the 
same share ID
2
 through one or more methods as outlined in Table 2 (BitTorrent Inc., 2008; BitTorrent Inc., 2015a). 
Once peers have established a connection, they exchange peer lists to augment the peer list supplied by the tracker 
through a process known as peer exchange (Hunt, 2014). The data transfers are facilitated by the BitTorrent 
protocol, which uses a combination of TCP/IP and Micro Transport Protocol (µTP) as its transport protocol. All 
traffic between devices is encrypted with AES-128 in counter mode, using a unique session key derived from the 
RO key (BitTorrent Inc., 2015b). 
Table 2: Peer discovery methods. 
Peer discovery method Description 
Use relay server when required This option allows BitTorrent Sync to use the BitTorrent's relay server as an intermediary for connection 
with peers in the scenario when direct connection is not possible as a result of sophisticated NATs, 
firewalls, proxy servers, etc. 
Use tracker server A tracker server holds a list of share IDs as well as network information (e.g., IP addresses and port 
numbers) needed for peers establish direct connections with other peers. Peers with internal subnet 
matches will be directed to connect using LAN. 
Search Local Area Network 
(LAN) 
When LAN discovery is enabled, BitTorrent Sync sends multicast packets (which contains the 
requesting share IDs as well as IP address and port number combinations of the requesting nodes) across 
the local network to locate nodes sharing the same share IDs. 
Search Distributed Hash Table 
(DHT) network 
This option enables BitTorrent Sync to connect to a BitTorrent/uTorrent's DHT network and 
subsequently uses the DHT table to locate peers that share the same share IDs, eliminating the need for a 
tracker server. 
Predefined hosts This option allows peers to be contacted directly through a list of explicitly defined IP address and port 
combinations. 
During synchronisation, each data is broken down into small pieces prior to transmission. In order to 
achieve minimal bandwidth usage, only pieces containing changes are transmitted. The folder contents are compared 
between all peers from time to time to determine changes and the sync files are replaced by the newest version held 
by any peer (BitTorrent Inc., 2015b). The overwritten or deleted files will be kept in the folder’s archive for 30 days 
by default, but the duration can be modified by the user. 
2.3 Related Work 
Scholars have noted the legal challenges involving cross-jurisdictional cloud forensic investigations 
(Mason and George, 2011; Taylor et al, 2012; Hooper et al., 2013), as well as the complexity and research 
opportunities in relation to cloud forensic investigations (Dykstra and Sherman, 2011; Birk et al., 2011; Ruan et al. 
2011, Dominik, 2011; Damshenas et al., 2012; Daryabar et al., 2013; Simou, 2014). Research with a technical focus 
generally aims to address particular challenges associated with the on-device and remote collections of data artefacts 
from a decentralised cloud infrastructure (Zafarullah et al., 2011; Marty, 2011; Martini and Choo, 2012; Martini and 
Choo, 2013; Quick et al., 2014; Dykstra and Sherman, 2013; Zawoad et al., 2013; Gebhardt
 
and Reiser, 2013; 
Martini and Choo 2014c). The studies of Chung et al. (2012), Quick and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2014), Hale (2013), 
Thethi and Keana (2014), Oestreicher (2014), Farina et al. (2014), Shariati, Dehghantanha, and Choo (2015), 
Shariati, Dehghantanha, Martini, and Choo (2015), and Martini, Do, and Choo (2015) found that metadata and other 
data artefacts could potentially be recovered from client devices used to access cloud services, even when the data 
has been erased using eraser software, such as Eraser and CCleaner (Quick and Choo, 2013a, 2013b, 2014). Quick 
and Choo (2013c) also determined that the act of downloading data from cloud counterparts using a web or client 
                                                          
1 A swarm a collection of peers sharing the same torrent file (BitTorrent Inc., 2014). 
2 A share ID is the SHA1 of the master key used by a share folder (Scanlon et al., 2014a). 
 application does not modify the hash of the data of relevance despite changes in file creation/modification times. 
The effectiveness of commercial forensic tools (e.g. Guidance EnCase, the Forensics Tool Kit (FTK), Memoryze, 
and AWS Export) in acquiring evidence remotely from the Amazon EC2 servers has also been studied (Dykstra and 
Sherman, 2012). 
A number of cloud-focused forensic frameworks and investigative guidelines have also been proposed in 
the literature. The first cloud forensic framework was proposed by Martini and Choo (2012), which was used to 
investigate ownCloud (Martini and Choo, 2013), Amazon EC2 (Thethi and Keana, 2014), VMWare (Martini and 
Choo 2014c), XtreemFS (Martini and Choo 2014b), Ubuntu One (Shariati, Dehghantanha, Martini and Choo 2015), 
SugarSync (Shariati, Dehghantanha and Choo 2015), etc. The four-stage framework was subsequently extended and 
validated using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive and ownCloud (Quick et al. 2014). Chung et al. (2012) proposed 
a cloud investigation guideline, which was used to investigate Amazon S3, Google Docs, and Evernote on 
Windows, Mac OS, iOS, and Android devices.  
In to the context of our study, Farina et al. (2014) examined the potential of recovering forensic artefacts 
from computers (running Windows XP, Windows 7, and Linux Debian) and network capture involving the use of 
BitTorrent Sync (version 1.1.82), and Scanlon et al. (2014a, 2014b, 2015) presented an investigative framework for 
the remote collection of evidence from a decentralised file synchronisation network.  Since a redesigned folder 
sharing workflow has been introduced in the newer version of BitTorrent Sync (from version 1.4 onwards; 
BitTorrent, 2015d), there is a need to develop an up-to-date understanding of the artefacts from the newer BitTorrent 
Sync applications. 
3. Research Methodology 
In this research, we adopt the cloud investigative framework proposed by Martini and Choo (2012) – see 
Figure 1. As explained by Martini and Choo (2012), a key characteristic of their framework is the iteration 
introduced in the Examination and Analysis phase. This allows one or more simultaneous iteration(s) of the 
framework with evidence source identification and preservation via the associated parties (i.e., CSP, peer node users 
when undertaking p2p storage cloud investigation, etc.) when evidence of cloud computing use is subsequently 
discovered on a client device. We demonstrate the utility in the context of this research as follows: 
1. Evidence source identification and preservation. In the first phase, the physical hardware of interest was 
identified, which contained the virtual disk files (VMDK) and virtual memory files (VMEM) in each VM 
folder. The mobile devices used in this research were a HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4 and an 
Apple iPhone 4 running on iOS version 7.1.2. A forensic copy was created for each VMDK and VMEM 
file in E01 container and raw image file (.dd) formats respectively. For the mobile devices, we made a bit-
for-bit image of the internal storage and subsequently converted the images to the E01 container format. An 
MD5 and SHA1 hash was calculated for each original file and subsequently verified for each copy. 
2. Collection. In this phase, we collected data containing the details needed for analysis from the forensic 
images (see Section 4). Similar to the earlier evidence source identification and preservation phase, an 
MD5 and SHA1 hash was calculated for each original file and subsequently verified for each collected or 
exported file. 
3. Examination and Analysis. This phase is concerned with examination and analysis of data at rest, in motion, 
or in execution collected in our research. The search terms were determined from the filenames observed, 
text from within the Enron data files, as well the BitTorrent Sync instances created during the research. 
These included: 
 ‘bittorrent’, ‘BitTorrent Sync’, ‘torrent’, ‘btsync’ 
 ‘enron3111’, ‘3111’,  ‘Enron’ 
 identity names such as ‘host’ and ‘guest’ 
 Sync links, share IDs, peer IDs, folder IDs, certificate fingerprints, temporary Keys, and other IDs 
and keys relevant to BitTorrent Sync. 
In this research, we started by analysing the guest VMs/devices. Afterwards, we iterated the framework 
with evidence source identification, preservation, and analysis via the host/peer VMware Workstations 
(VMs) using the BitTorrent Sync artefacts recovered from the guest VMs or devices.  
4. Reporting and presentation. We reported our findings, as described in this paper.  
  
Figure 1: Cloud forensics framework of Martini and Choo (2012). 
3.1 Experimental Setup 
Two VMs were created for each operating system (OS) investigated to represent the host and the guest 
workstations. As explained by Quick and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2014), using physical hardware to undertake setup, 
erasing, copying, and re-installing would have been an onerous exercise. Moreover, a virtual machine allows room 
for error by enabling the test environment to be reverted to a restore point if the results are unfavourable. The hard 
drive and RAM were configured with minimal space in order to reduce the time required to analyse the considerable 
amounts of snapshots. A total of 24 VM snapshots was made of each workstation representing 24 real life scenarios 
of using BitTorrent Sync (e.g., install, access, upload, download, view, delete, and uninstall) on various operating 
systems - see Table 3. For the purpose of computer forensic analysis, the data sharing was only limited to the default 
peer discovery setting (by having the ‘Use relay server when required’, ‘Use tracker server’, and ‘Search LAN’ 
options checked) with a Read and Write permission. 
Table 3: Configurations of virtual machines for BitTorrent Sync client application analysis on Windows 8.1. 
OS Host VM/Guest VM VM details 
Windows 8.1 
(client 
application) 
Base-VM 
1.0, 2.0, 3.0 
A base VM snapshot was prepared for each OS as a control media to determine changes 
during each experiment with the following configurations:  
• Windows 8.1 Professional (ServicePack 1, 64-bit, build 9600) with 2GB RAM and 20GB 
hard disk (1.0).  
• Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS with 1GB RAM and 20GB hard disk (2.0).  
• Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 with 1GB RAM and 60GB hard disk (3.0).  
Install-VM 
1.1, 2.1, 3.1 
By duplicating a copy of the base snapshot (1.0, 2.0, and 3.0), we accessed the BitTorrent 
Sync website (https://www.getsync.com/) to download and subsequently install BitTorrent 
Sync version 2.0.93 (the latest version at the time of this research. A separate identity was 
created for each device/VM. 
Access-VM 
1.1.1, 2.1.1, 3.1.1 
A copy of install snapshot (1.1, 2.1, and 3.1) was made to examine the process of logging in 
the BitTorrent Sync client application. 
Upload/Download-
VM  
1.1.2, 2.1.2, 3.1.2 
(Synchronise) 
A second copy of the install snapshot (1.1, 2.1, and 3.1) was made to examine the process of 
syncing files using the default peer discovery settings. The Enron dataset files were copied 
from the host machine to C:\Sync\, /home/[User Profile]/Sync/, and /Users/[User 
Profile]/Sync/ of the Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS host workstations. A sync link was then 
generated for the sync directory and subsequently used to link with the guest workstaion. The 
creation, modified, and last accessed times of each file were noted to detect changes in 
timestamps after transferring files.  
Delete-VM 
1.1.2.1, 2.1.2.1. 
3.1.2.1 (Synchronise) 
A copy of the upload/download snapshot (1.1.2, 2.1.2, 3.1.2) was created to assess the process 
of deleting the uploaded files on the host workstations and determined changes to the guest 
workstations and vice versa.  
Disconnect-VM 
1.1.2.2, 2.1.2.2,  
3.1.2.2 
A second copy of the upload/download snapshot (1.1.2, 2.1.2, 3.1.2) was made to examine the 
process of disconnecting a shared folder. The option ‘Delete files from this device’ option was 
selected to remove the synced files completely from the host workstations.  
Uninstall-VM/ 
1.1.2.3, 2.1.2.3,  
3.1.2.3 
A final copy of the upload/download snapshot (3.1.1) was made to examine the process of 
uninstalling the BitTorrent Sync client application. Since BitTorrent Sync does not come with 
an uninstaller, the uninstallation was undertaken using the Windows ‘Programs and Features’ 
function in the Control Panel; the commands “find / -name ".sync" -type d -exec rm -rf {} \” 
and “find / -name "BitTorrent Sync" -type f -exec rm -rf {} \” on the Ubuntu OS workstation. 
manual dragging of the BitTorrent Sync folders of relevance to the Trash directory on the Mac 
OS workstation. 
 Unlink-VM 
1.1.3, 2.1.3, 3.1.3 
 
A final copy of the install snapshots (1.1, 2.1, and 3.1) was made to investigate the process of 
unlinking an identity on the desktop clients investigated. 
 
Similar to the approaches of Quick and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2014) and Shariati et al. (2015a, 2015b), the 
3111th email messages of the UC Berkeley Enron email dataset (downloaded from 
http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/enron_email.html on 24
th
 of September 2014) were used to create the sample files 
and saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF formats. Each VM was shut down and a 
snapshot was taken of the VM after each experiment occurred, allowing the VM to be reverted back to this state 
when needed. The RAM captures were taken immediately after each experiment, just prior to shutdown in our 
research. The physical memory dumps were instantiated by the Virtual Memory (.VMEM) files (created by 
VMware) to represent captures of memory dumps which are not being adulterated with the use of memory 
acquisition software (Quick and Choo, 2013a; 2013b). A similar consideration was made with respect to 
running/hosting physical acquisition and network capture software on the VMs. Hence, we instantiated the physical 
hard drive with the Virtual Machine Disk (.VMDK) files (created by VMware) and hosted the packet capture 
software on the local host. 
In order to undertake analysis into the mobile apps, we prepared a default factory restored iPhone 4 running 
iOS 7.1.2 and a HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4. We then jailbroke/rooted both the devices using Pangu8 
v1.1 and Odin3 v.185 to enable root access, respectively. To examine the matter in which the file systems were 
treated in relation to different BitTorrent Sync usage scenarios, we created a series of physical images of the mobile 
devices using dd over SSH/ADB Shell. In particular, the first image was undertaken prior to the installation of the 
BitTorrent Sync apps to create the control base images for this research. Then, the BitTorrent Sync iOS app version 
2.0.27.1 and Android app version 2.0.85.0 were installed on the respective devices to make the second image 
respectively. A third image was undertaken after downloading sync files from the ‘H1.1.1 Upload-VM’ (see Table 
1). Additionally, an extra image was made of the Android device to examine the process of adding and uploading a 
shared folder using the BitTorrent Sync app (unsupported by the iOS app). Next, we created an image of both the 
devices to assess the process of deleting the shared folder. The final image was made following the uninstallation of 
the apps.  
The packet capture software was started prior and stopped immediately after each experiment was carried 
out. The experiments were predominantly undertaken in NATed (where NAT stands for Network Address 
Translation) network environment and without firewall outbound restriction to represent a typical BitTorrent Sync 
usage situation. Each experiment was repeated at least thrice (at different dates) for consistency of findings. Table 4 
details the tools prepared for this research.  
Table 4: Tools prepared. 
Tool Usage 
FTK Imager Version 3.2.0.0 To create forensic images for the .VMDK files. 
dd version 1.3.4-1 To produce a bit-for-bit image of mobile devices’ internal storage as well as .VEM files. 
Autopsy 3.1.1 To parse the file system, produce directory listings, as well as extracting or analysing 
stored files, browsing history, ‘NTUSER.dat’ registry files (using the RegRipper plugin), 
‘pagefile.sys’ Windows swap file, and unallocated spaces located within the forensics 
images of VMDK files. 
emf_decrypter.py To decrypt the iOS images acquired for analysis. 
HxD Version 1.7.7.0 To conduct keyword searches in the unstructured datasets. 
Volatility 2.4 To analyse the running processes (using the ‘pslist’ function), network statistics (using the 
‘netscan’ function), and detecting the location of a string (using the ‘yarascan’ function) 
recorded in the physical memory dumps. 
SQLite Browser Version 3.4.0 To view the contents of SQLite database files. 
Wireshark version 1.10.1 To analyse the network traffic. 
Network Miner version 1.6.1 To analyse and data carve the network files. 
Whois command To determine the registration information of the IP addresses. 
Photorec 7.0 To data carve the unstructured datasets. 
File juicer 4.45 To extract files from files. 
Nirsoft Web Browser Passview 1.19.1 To recover the credential details stored within web browsers. 
Nirsoft cache viewer, ChromeCacheView 1.56, 
MozillaCacheView 1.62, IECacheView 1.53 
To analyse the web browsing cache. 
BrowsingHistoryView v.1.60 To analyse the web browsing history. 
 Thumbcacheviewer Version 1.0.2.7 To examine the Windows thumbnail cache. 
Windows Event Viewer Version 1.0 To view the Windows event logs. 
Console Version 10.10 (543) To view the Mac-OS-specific log files (e.g., Apple System Logs). 
Windows File Analyser 2.6.0.0 To analyse the Windows prefetch and link files. 
Plist Explorer v1.0 To examine the contents of the Apple PLIST files extracted from iPhone Analyser. 
chainbreaker.py  To extract the master keys stored in Mac’s Keychain dump. 
NTFS Log Tracker To parse and analyse the $LogFile, $MFT, and $UsnJrnl New Technology File System 
(NTFS) files. 
BEncode Editor v0.7.1.0 To view the contents of bencode files. 
4. BitTorrent Sync analysis on desktop clients 
Before undertaking the evidential analysis, we collected test data that matched the search terms ‘Bittorent 
sync’, ‘btsync’, and ‘Enron’ in the hard disk images, but held formats unsupported by the Autopsy forensic browser 
for analysis using the tools of relevance in the latter phase. These included SQLite database files, PLIST files, 
prefetch files, event logs, shortcuts, thumbnail cache, $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, as well as web browsers’ data 
folders/files (e.g., %AppData% \Local\Google, %AppData% \Local\Microsoft \Windows \WebCache, %AppData% 
\Roaming\Mozilla, %AppData% \Local\Microsoft \Windows \Temporary Files \index.dat). The volatile data was 
collected using the Volatility tools, Photorec file carver, and HxD Hex Editor for the physical memory dumps, and 
Wireshark and Netminer network analysis software for the network captures.  
Whilst undertaking keyword search for the data of relevance, we determined that there was no data related 
to BitTorrent Sync and the Enron emails on the control base VM snapshots (1.0, 1.1 IE, 1.2 MF, 1.3 GC, 2.0, and 
3.0). This suggested that the BitTorrent Sync/Enron related data located in the remaining snapshots were remnants 
from BitTorent Sync use. An inspection of the metadata of the downloaded files on the Windows 8.1 client observed 
that the last accessed and modified timestamps were the times when the files were downloaded, and the last written 
timestamps retained its original value unchanged. On the Ubuntu client, the added timestamps were the times when 
the files were downloaded, while all other timestamps (i.e., modification, creation, and last opened) remained 
unchanged. As for the Mac OS client, only the accessed timestamps matched the file download times; the 
modification timestamps preserved its original timestamps. In all cases, we determined that the MD5 and SHA1 
hash values for the downloaded files were similar to the that of the original copies, suggesting that no alteration was 
made during the file transfers.  
4.1 Directory listings and files of forensic interest 
The downloaded folders were saved at %Users%\[User Profile]\BitTorrent Sync, /home/[User 
profile]/BitTorrent Sync, and /Users/[User Profile]/BitTorrent Sync on the Windows 8.1, Ubuntu OS, and Mac OS 
clients by default, respectively; Within the shared folders (both locally added and downloaded) there is a hidden 
‘.sync’ subfolder. The file of particular interest stored within the subfolder is the ‘ID’ file which holds the folder-
specific share ID in hex dump format. The share ID would be especially useful when seeking to identify peers 
sharing the same folder during network analysis (Scanlon et al., 2014a, 2014b). 
When a synced file was deleted, we were able to recover copies of the deleted file from the /.sync/Archive 
folder of the corresponding peer devices. Depending on the duration configured by the users, it is important to note 
that the deleted files will only be kept in the archive folder for 30 days by default (BitTorrent Sync, 2015). The 
presence of the ‘.sync’ subfolder also means when a user synchronises or deletes a file in BitTorrent Sync Windows 
application, there will be filename and timestamp references for the synced or deleted files in NTFS files such as 
$LogFile, $MFT, $UsnJrnl to identify its use. 
In addition, we could recover copies of the deleted files alongside the pertinent file deletion information (e.g., 
the original paths, file sizes, and deletion times) from the %$Recycle.Bin%\SID folder on Windows 8.1, but the 
filenames were renamed to a set of random characters prefixed with $R and $I. On Ubuntu OS, we were able to 
recover copies of the deleted files from the /home/[User Profile]/.local/share/Trash/files trash folder. To identify the 
original file paths as well as deletion times, we analysed the .TRASHINFO files located in /home/[User 
Profile]/.local/share/Trash/info/. In contrast to Windows and Ubuntu OS, examination of the Mac OS trash folder 
(located at /Users/[User profile]/.Trash) was only able to recover copies of the deleted files. However, it is 
 noteworthy that the findings are only applicable to the system that initiated the file deletion and in the circumstance 
when recycle bin or trash folder is not emptied. 
Other than inspecting the directory listing, we identified that the practitioner could potentially recover the 
BitTorrent Sync usage information from various metadata files resided in the application folder located at 
%AppData%\Roaming\BitTorrent Sync on Windows 8.1 (was previously stored at %Documents and 
Settings%\[User Profile]\Application Data\BitTorrent Sync) and /Users/[User Profile/Library/Application 
Support/BitTorrent Sync on Mac OS. Similar to the installation folder, the application folder of the Linux client 
application is the directory where the application package is unpacked. The application folder maintains a similar 
directory structure across multiple operating systems, and the /%BitTorrent Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number> 
subfolder is an identity-specific application folder that will be synchronised across multiple devices sharing the same 
identity. 
The first file of particular interest with the application folder is the settings.dat file. This file maintains a list 
of metadata associated with the device under investigation such as the installation path (which could be 
distinguished from the ‘exe_path’ entry), installation time in Unix epoch format (‘install_time’), non-encoded peer 
ID (‘peer_id’), log size (‘log_size’), registered URLs for peer search (‘search_list’, ‘tracker_last’ etc.), and other 
information of relevance.  
The second file of forensic interest with the application folder is the sync.dat file, which contains a wealth of 
information relating to the shared folders added by or downloaded to the device under investigation. In particular, 
the device name could be discerned from the ‘device’ entry. The ‘identity’ entry records the identity name (‘name’) 
of the device under investigation as well as the private (‘private_keys’) and public keys (‘public_keys’) used to 
establish connections with other devices. A similar finding was observed for the peer identities in the ‘identities’ 
entry. We also located a replication of the ‘identity’ and ‘identities’ entries in the local-identity-specific 
/%BitTorrent Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number>/identity.dat file and the peer-identity-specific /%BitTorrent 
Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number>/identities/[Certificate fingerprint] file (with the exception of the private key) 
respectively. The device or identity name could prove useful in correlating events initiated by a specific identity or 
device in the log/metadata files or any external data obtained from the peer devices. Meanwhile, the ‘access-
requests’ entry holds a list of metadata pertaining to the identities which sent folder access requests to the device 
under investigation such as the last used IP addresses in network byte order (‘addr’), identity names (‘name’), public 
keys ‘public_keys’) of the requesting identities, as well as the base32-encoded temporary keys (‘invite’), requested 
folder IDs, requested times (‘req_time’), requested permissions (‘requested_permissions’ where we hypothesised 
that 2 indicates read only, 3 indicates read and write, and 4 indicates owner), and granted permission 
(‘granted_permissions’).  
Located within the ‘folders’ entry of the sync.dat file was metadata relating to the synced folders. It should 
be noted that this entry will never be empty as it will always contain at least an entry for the identity-specific 
/%BitTorrent Sync%/SyncUser<Random number> application folder. Amongst the information of forensic interest 
recoverable from the ‘folders’ entry included the folder IDs (‘folder_id’), storage paths (‘path’), the addition and last 
modified dates in Unix epoch format, the peer discovery method(s) used to share the synced folders, the access and 
root certificates keys, whether the folders have been moved to trash, and other information of relevance. We then 
correlated the folder IDs with the folder IDs located in /%BitTorrent Sync%/SyncUser<Random 
number>/devices/[Base32-encoded Peer ID]\folders\ to determine the shared folders associated with a peer device. 
To identify the actual (non-encoded) peer ID and corresponding device name, we mapped the encoded peer ID to the 
pertinent entries in sync.log (see Table 5). Analysis of the access control list (‘acl’) subentry (of the ‘folders’ entry) 
was able to identify the permission information relating to the identities associated with each shared folder, such as 
the identity names (‘name’), public keys (‘public_keys’), signature issuers, the times when the identities were linked 
to a specific shared folder, as well as other information of relevance. We also located the similar details in the 
folder-specific /%BitTorrent Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number>/folders/[Folder ID]/info.dat file. The ‘peers’ 
subentry (of the ‘folders’ entry), if available, would provide a practitioner information about the peers associated 
with the shared folders added by the device under investigation such as the last completed sync time 
(‘last_sync_completed’), last used IP address (‘last_addr’) in network byte order, device name (’name’), last seen 
time (‘last_seen’), last data sent time (‘last_data_sent’), and other relevant information. 
  
Figure 2: sync.dat. 
Another file of interest which can potentially allow a practitioner to recover the sync metadata is the 
/%BitTorrent Sync%/[share-ID].db SQLite3 database.  This share-ID-specific database describes the content of a 
share folder (including the /%BitTorrent Sync%/SyncUser<Random number> application folder) such as the shared 
filenames or folder names (stored in the ‘path’ table field of the ‘files’ table), hashes, and transfer piece registers for 
the shared files or folders. Once the shared filenames or folder names have been identified, the practitioner could 
then map the details to the /%BitTorrent Sync%/history.dat file (which maintains a list of file syncing events 
appeared in the History windows of the BitTorrent Sync client application) to obtain the sync times in Unix epoch 
format as well as the associated device names - see Figure 3. 
  
Figure 3: history.dat. 
Within the /%BitTorrent Sync%/sync.pid file there holds the last used process identifier (PID) in plain text. 
The PID could assist the practitioner in correlating data associated with the BitTorrent Sync client application during 
RAM analysis (e.g., mapping a string of relevance to the data resided in the memory space of the PID using the 
‘yarascan’ function of Volatility). It is important to note that all the metadata files aforementioned are bencoded  
(with the exception of the sync.pid file) and the old metadata files will be given an .OLD extension. Moreover, the 
sync.dat, settings.dat, and history.dat files are protected with a salted file guard key to ensure that only the 
BitTorrent Sync application can edit the files (Farina et al., 2014). 
When BitTorrent Sync was accessed on a Mac OS device, we were able to locate additional references to the 
client application usage in the preference files located in /Users/[User profile]/Library/Preferences/. For instance, 
the com.apple.spotlight.plist file holds the app path and the last used time in plain text (see Figure 4). In the 
com.bittorrent.Sync.plist file, we recovered supporting information for timeline analysis such as the app version 
installed, last software update check time, and last started time in Unix epoch format. 
 
Figure 4: com.apple.spotlight.plist 
Disconnecting a shared folder, it was observed that no changes were made to the peer devices, even when 
the option ‘delete files from this device’ was selected to permanently delete the sync files/folders from the local 
device. When we unlinked an identity from the devices investigated, it was identified that the identity-specific 
/%BitTorrent Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number> application folder will be deleted from the local device. On the 
other hand, only the identity-specific metadata will be removed from the ‘identity’ and ‘identities’ entries of the 
local and peer device’s settings.dat file respectively. 
Undertaking uninstallation of the Windows client application observed discern the synced folders from 
folders containing the ‘.sync’ subfolder in the directory listing. Our manual uninstallation of the Linux and Mac 
client applications left no trace of the client application usage/installation in the directory listing, but the deleted 
files/folders were recoverable from the non-emptied /Users/[User profile]/.Trash folder of the Mac OSX VM 
investigated. 
 Similar to the memory analysis, undertaking data carving of the unallocated space (of the file 
synchronisation VMs) managed to recover copies of synced files as well as the log and metadata files of forensic 
interest (e.g., sync.log, sync.dat, history.dat, and settings.dat used by the client applications) intact. A search for the 
terms ‘bittorrent’, ‘enron’, bencode keys specific to the metadata files of relevance, as well as the pertinent log 
entries was able to locate copies of the recovered files aforementioned in plain text. The remnants remained even 
after uninstallation of client applications, which suggested that unallocated space is an important source for 
recovering deleted BitTorrent Sync or synced files. 
4.2 Log files 
Logs play a vital role in reconstructing a criminal scene (Ab Rahman and Choo 2015). BitTorrent Sync stores 
the logs in the application folder and the filename of which is displayed as ‘sync.log’. The default log size is 100MB 
and can be modified by the user. When the maximum size is reached, the log file is renamed to sync.log.old, and a 
new sync.log file will be created. As BitTorrent Sync does not implement an encryption algorithm to secure its logs, 
the logs could be easily accessible using a text editor. The log file is important as it would aid in identifying 
BitTorrent Sync events around a specific time of incident. Table 5 and Table 6 summarise a list of notable log 
entries forensic interest from sync.log. 
Table 5: Log entries of forensic interest from sync.log. 
Relevance Examples of log entries obtained in our research 
Enables a practitioner to identify the 
BitTorrent Sync version installed on the 
device under investigation. 
 platform: Windows workstation 6.3.0 x86 
version: 2.0.93 
Assist the practitioner in determining the non-
encoded peer ID of the device under 
investigation. 
 [2015-04-03 16:18:32] My PeerID: 
103B760A3674FE44C4A512B4EF802D452F633F99 
A master folder will only be created during 
identity creation. This potentially allows the 
practitioner to determine when BitTorrent 
Sync was first used on a device. 
 [2015-04-03 16:19:50] MD[init]: Master Folder: create 
May assist the practitioner in determining the 
IP addresses used by the device under 
investigation. 
 [2015-04-03 16:18:30] Using IP address 192.168.220.176 
 [2015-04-03 16:31:03] Changing IP address from 192.168.220.176 to 192.168.220.143 
Informs the practitioner the IP addresses used 
by the peer devices. 
 [2015-04-04 09:05:32] Incoming connection from 192.168.220.176:49734 
 [2015-04-03 16:51:58] SD[BBAD]: Peer 1: local IP 192.168.220.176:20566 
 [2015-04-03 16:51:47] SD[BBAD]: Got ping (broadcast: 1) from peer 
192.168.220.176:20566 (10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5) 
 Peer 1: 60.50.83.170:49449 10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5 
 [2015-04-05 08:23:56] SF[1F7E] [A2B5]: Found peer 
10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5 192.168.220.176:49759 direct:1 
transport:1 version: 2.0.93 
Allows a practitioner to identify the device 
names of the peer devices. 
 [2015-04-05 09:05:32] SF[B5E2] [A2B5]: Got id message from peer WIN-
KMM6MUN4701 (10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5) 2.0.93 
 [2015-04-17 12:51:19] MD[A965]: new device found  WIN-KMM6MUN4701 
(CDPMQEE6KJCDTWKFJK7CXMKHLP35LIVV) 
Since most peer IDs are stored in base32 
format in the metadata and configuration 
files, these log entries would provide a 
potential method for identification of the 
actual (non-encoded) peer IDs from the 
device names.  
 [2015-04-05 09:05:32] SF[B5E2] [A2B5]: Got id message from peer WIN-
KMM6MUN4701 (10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5) 2.0.93 
 [2015-04-15 12:30:31] SD[4F11]: Got ping (broadcast: 1) from peer 
192.168.220.146:50523 (107C1CFB546B565559FE2929E7B7C8804E7302F0)  
 [2015-04-17 12:51:19] MD[A965]: new device found  WIN-KMM6MUN4701 
(CDPMQEE6KJCDTWKFJK7CXMKHLP35LIVV) 
 [2015-04-17 12:51:19] API: callback id=19, value="{ "value": 
{"peerid":"CDPMQEE6KJCDTWKFJK7CXMKHLP35LIVV"}}", can_deferred=0, 
_delegate=0x1c57d48… 
May assist the practitioner in determining the 
share IDs for the shared folders added. 
 [2015-04-05 11:37:54] SSLEH[0x15fa28b0]: hello packet 
{ share:6C25389E651AC160F91ECAF3D9A249C58F6BED15 } has been sent 
 [2015-04-05 11:37:54] SSLEH[0x08e849e8]: received hello packet, 
{ share:6C25389E651AC160F91ECAF3D9A249C58F6BED15 } 
 [2015-04-05 11:47:58] Requesting peers from tracker 52.1.1.135:3000 for share 
6C25389E651AC160F91ECAF3D9A249C58F6BED15 
Enables identification of the shared folder 
names/IDs created on the device under 
investigation. 
 [2015-04-04 20:36:45] FC[B5E2]: started periodic scan for "\\?\C:\Sync" 
 [2015-04-05 11:37:57] MD[A965]: [apply] Processing folder "Sync" (-
2775350472753142605) 
 Assists the practitioner in determining the 
synced filenames or folder names as well as 
the addition/creation times. 
  [2015-04-05 08:24:17] JOURNAL[22F5]: new torrent created for file Enron3111.txt 
mt:1418488391 9603FC44BB0F59A822FA3331A1802F880ABA583B 
[2015-04-05 08:24:17] JOURNAL[22F5]: setting time for file 
"\\?\C:\Sync\Enron3111.txt" to 1428193457 
[2015-04-05 08:24:17] JOURNAL[22F5]: insert file "\\?\C:\Sync\Enron3111.txt" = 
131072:22982 
… 
Informs the practitioner folder names for the 
deleted folders as well as the deletion times.  
 [2015-06-28 23:41:17] Folder being removed from this device and the files at 
'\\?\C:\Sync' are being removed. 
Allows the practitioner to determine the local 
identity’s disconnection time. 
 [2015-04-05 09:12:01] Master Folder Controller: disconnect master folder 
 
Table 6: Records of BitTorrent Sync’s Application Programming Interface (API) response bodies (in JSON format) 
of forensic interest from sync.log. 
Relevance Examples of log entries obtained in our research 
Provides the practitioner details about the 
device under investigation such as the peer 
ID, device name, last online time, last sync 
completed time, and folder IDs for the shared 
folders created/added. 
 [2015-04-05 09:11:53] API: <-- getmfdevices({ "status": 200, "value": [{ "aod": false, 
"devicename": "WIN-KMM6MUN4701", "folders": [ { "added": true, "id": -
7338009380596345790, "mode": 1 }, { "added": true, "id": 3964779361527927184, 
"mode": 1 }, { "added": true, "id": 4780923171276619705, "mode": 1 }, { "added": true, 
"id": 5471258729987051831, "mode": 1 } ], "id": 
"CDPMQEE6KJCDTWKFJK7CXMKHLP35LIVV", "lastseen": 1428196287, 
"lastsynccompleted": 1428196287, "name": "WIN-KMM6MUN4701", "online": true, 
"self": false, "syncerr": 0, "syncerrmsg": "", "userid": "" } ] })… 
Assists the practitioner in determining the 
pending user requests sent to the device under 
investigation including the folder IDs (if 
any), the times when the requests were sent, 
access permissions, as well as the requester’s 
IP addresses and certificate fingerprints.  
  [2015-04-03 16:51:48] API: <-- getpendingrequests({ "status": 200, "value": 
[ { "access_level": 3, "id": "5471258729987051831", "ip": "192.168.220.176", "license": 
false, "readwrite": true, "time": 1428051108, "user_identity": { "devicename": "device", 
"fingerprint": 
"2UMI566O3XAE7BB2V3N3YWWECJ3TCGJHMRGZTVLN2SZY276QI4AQ", 
"username": "Guest" } } ] })… 
May assist a practitioner in determining the 
folder names, folder IDs, storage paths,  
folder sizes, timestamp information, as well 
as peer device names, peer IDs, and 
fingerprints associated with the shared folders 
added by or downloaded to the device under 
investigation. 
 [2015-04-05 09:05:37] API: <-- getsyncfolders({ "folders": [ { "access": 4, "archive": 
"C:\\Sync\\.sync\\Archive", "archive_files": 3, "archive_size": 153187, "date_added": 
1428049323, "down_eta": 0, "down_speed": 0, "down_status": 100, "error": 0, "files": 3, 
"folderid": "5471258729987051831", "has_key": true, "indexing": false, "ismanaged": 
true, "iswritable": true, "last_modified": 1428053450, "name": "Sync", "path": 
"C:\\Sync", "paused": false, "peers": [ { "direct": true, "downdiff": 0, "id": 
"10DEC8109E524439D9454ABE2BB1475BF7D5A2B5", "isonline": true, 
"lastreceivedtime": 0, "lastsenttime": 1428051120, "lastsynctime": 1428051129, "name": 
"WIN-KMM6MUN4701", "updiff": 0, "userid": 
"UQO52P4G5O2QU6OOGX3AS7R6RUAU22JBBWJ4H2CYNXHRO3KIRVBQ" }], 
"size": 321638, "status": "314.0 kB in 3 files", "stopped": false, "synclevel": 2, "up_eta": 
0, "up_speed": 0, "up_status": 100, "users": [{ "access": 3, "id": 
"2UMI566O3XAE7BB2V3N3YWWECJ3TCGJHMRGZTVLN2SZY276QI4AQ", 
"name": "Guest" } ] },  
… 
Informs the practitioner the storage path for 
the device under investigation. 
  [2015-04-03 16:43:13] API: <-- getfoldersstoragepath({ "status": 200, "value": 
"C:\\Users\\anonymous\\BitTorrent Sync" }) 
 [2015-04-05 09:05:33] API: <-- setfoldersstoragepath({ "path": 
"C:\\Users\\anonymous\\BitTorrent Sync", "status": 200 }) 
Allows the practitioner to identify the folder 
name, path, and timestamp references for the 
shared folders added by the device under 
investigation. 
 [2015-04-04 20:27:22] API: --> 
addsyncfolder(path=C%3A%5CSync&selectivesync=false&t=1428150442927) 
Contains copy of history.dat file (see section 
4.1) at the time of request. 
 [2015-04-05 08:33:06] API: <-- history({ "status": 200, "value": [{ "id": 39, "msg": 
"WIN-KMM6MUN4701 updated file Enron3111.zip", "time": 1428193777 }, { "id": 38, 
"msg": "WIN-KMM6MUN4701 updated file Enron3111.txt", "time": 1428193777 }, 
{ "id": 37, "msg": "Remote peer removed file Enron3111.rtf", "time": 1428193777 }, 
{ "id": 13, "msg": "Added file Enron3111.docx", "time": 1428153859 }… 
4.3 Physical memory 
Memory analysis is invaluable for recovering information which would otherwise be lost (Canlar et al., 
2013). Memory analysis in this research included undertaking data carving using Photorec, keyword search using a 
Hex editor, and contextualising the RAM contents using Volatility. During RAM analysis, a practitioner must aware 
that memory changes frequently according to users’ activities and will be wiped off as soon as the system is shut 
 down. Thus, the data remnants identified this research does not represent those recoverable in a typical "real world" 
circumstance but serves as a guideline for detecting possible recoverable evidences. 
Analysis of the running processes using the ‘pslist’ function of Volatility was able to recover the process 
name associated with the BitTorrent Sync client application (e.g., ‘BitTorrent Sync.exe’ for Windows OS, 
‘BitTorrent Sync’ for Linux OS, and ‘BitTorrent Sync’ for Mac OS), which included the process identifier (PID), 
parent process identifiers (PPID) as well as the process initiation time; Examinations of the network details using the 
‘netscan’ or ‘netstat’ function of Volatility determined that the network and socket information such as the 
transportation protocols used, local and remote IP addresses (including the IP addresses of the peer discovery 
methods used and the peer nodes), socket states, as well as the timestamp information could be recovered from the 
RAM (see Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5: An excerpt of BitTorrent Sync network information recovered using the ‘netscan’ function of Volatility.  
Undertaking data carving of the RAM captures and swap files determined that only the images used by the 
client application and synced files could be recovered. However, a search for the term ‘btsync’ or ‘bittorrent sync’ 
was able to recover the complete text of the log and metadata files of forensic interest (e.g., sync.log, sync.dat, 
history.dat, and settings.dat) in the RAM in plain text. In cases when the original file has been deleted, a Yarascan 
search for the text from the remnants could help attribute the remnants to the BitTorrent Sync or other processes of 
relevance to identify its origin. Figure 6 illustrates an occurrence of history.dat in the memory space of ‘BitTorrent 
Sync.exe’ of the Windows 8.1 VM investigated. The term ‘bittorrent’, bencode keys specific to the metadata files of 
relevance (see Section 4.1 and Section 4.2), and log entries as identified in Table 5 could be used to narrow down 
the search space.  
 
Figure 6: Copy of history.dat file recovered from the memory space of ‘BitTorrent Sync.exe’. 
Unsurprisingly, a keyword search for Enron-related keywords (e.g., ‘Enron’) was able to locate the 
complete text of the sample files in the RAM captures of all the file synchronisation VMs investigated. Although the 
login credentials were encrypted, we were able to recover the username (login email) and password for the Linux 
client application’s web GUI following the strings ‘username=’ and ‘nwpwd=’ in the RAM respectively. These 
appeared to be remnants from the form input field of the Linux client application’s web GUI; an example is shown 
in Figure 7. In addition, we also located several password hits in the similar fragments containing the login email in 
the memory space of BitTorrent Sync.  In a real life scenario, this could potentially provide the practitioner the 
 opportunity to extrapolate the login password from the non-dictionary or alphanumeric terms surrounding the email 
string in the memory space of BitTorrent Sync. 
 
Figure 7: Username and password recovered from the RAM of Ubuntu OS. 
4.4 Thumbnail cache 
Analysis of the Windows thumbcache (stored under %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Explorer) 
recovered copies of thumbnail images for the BitTorrent Sync client application and its download site (e.g., 
BitTorrent Sync logo and image icons), indicative of BitTorrent Sync usage. Examinations of the thumbnail cache 
from the file synchronisation VMs only revealed copies of thumbnail images for the synced files from the Windows 
8.1 and Mac OS VMs. We could discern the thumbnail cache from the ‘folder’ table field (of the ‘files’ table) which 
made reference to ‘BitTorrent Sync’ in the /private/var/folders[Random subfolder]/[Random 
subfolder]/C/com.apple.QuickLook.thumbcache/index.sqlite database of the Mac OS VM investigated. The 
timestamp references recorded alongside the thumbnail cache would assist a practitioner to identify the last accessed 
or deletion (only in a Mac OS device; see Figure 8) date of a sync file or folder. Moreover, the presence of the 
thumbnail cache in the file deletion and uninstallation VMs suggests that thumbnail cache is an important source 
evidence to recover deleted images; this seems to agree with the findings of Quick et al. (2014b). Analysis of the 
Ubuntu VMs did not recover any thumbnail instance relevant to BitTorrent Sync. 
 
Figure 8: Thumbnail information recovered from the index.sqlite database of Mac OS’ thumbcache folder. 
4.5 Windows Registry 
Windows registry provides a rich source of information associated with installed programs (Do et al. 2014). 
Although five hives could be seen in the registry, only HKEY_USERS (HKU) and HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE 
(HKLM) hives are tangibly real since the remaining are merely symbolic links to the two master keys (Farmer, 
2007). Our analysis of the HKLM hive determined that the BitTorrent Sync installation could be detected from the 
presence of the HKLM\SOFTWARE\BitTorrent\Sync key, and the installation path could be discerned from the 
 ‘SyncPath’ subkey. In addition, the HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\BitTorrent 
Sync key could provide supporting information for the installation such as the display icon’s path, display name, 
BitTorrent Sync version installed, installation and uninstaller paths, and other entries of relevance. 
Similar to any other Windows application, when the BitTorrent Sync client application was started up, we 
located full path reference for the BitTorrent Sync executable file in HKU\<SID>\Software\Classes\Local 
Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\MuiCache, indicative of recent BitTorrent Sync usage. Further evidence 
to indicate the client application usage could be ascertained from the occurrence of ‘BitTorrent Sync: ""%Program 
Files%\BitTorrent Sync\BitTorrent Sync.exe"  /MINIMIZED"’ entry alongside the last executed time in 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run. 
Another registry key of forensic interest is the 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDig32, which keeps track of a list of filename 
references (e.g., filenames for the executable and synced files) associated with the BitTorrent Sync client application 
as well as the timestamp information during the last usage. According to Carvey (2014), the ‘CIDSizeMRU’ (MRU 
is the abbreviation for Most-Recently-Used) subkey maintains a list of recently used applications, the 
‘OpenSaveMRU’ registry subkey records list of files that have been opened or saved within a Windows shell dialog 
box, and the ‘LastVisitedMRU’ subkey is responsible for tracking specific executable files used by an application to 
open the files documented in the ‘OpenSaveMRU’ subkey. Other evidence indicating the BitTorrent Sync client 
application usage includes the presence of entries referencing the link file as well as the last executed time in 
Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist. 
4.6 Prefetch files 
Examination of the prefetch files located two prefetch files for BitTorrent Sync, namely 
‘BITTORRENT_SYNC.EXE.pf’ and ‘BITTORRENT SYNC.exe.pf’. Amongst the information of forensic interest 
recoverable from these files include the executable path, a number of times the application has been loaded, as well 
as the last run time which are useful to supplement timeline analysis. However, no prefetch instance was located for 
the synced files in our experiments. The presence of the prefetch files in the uninstall VMs (H1.1.1.3 and H1.1.1.3) 
implies that there will be BitTorrent Sync references remaining in the prefetch files to indicate its use after 
uninstallation of the client application. 
4.7 Link files 
Link (.lnk) files are shortcut metadata files used by Windows to maintain a list of linked paths relating to a 
file (commonly the paths where the original files are located), associated timestamps (created, written, and last 
accessed times), and file sizes (original and modified) which are useful to identify the origin of a file (Microsoft, 
2015). An inspection of the directory listings located instances of link file for %Program Files (x86)%\BitTorrent 
Sync\BitTorrent Sync.exe at %Users%\Public\Desktop\BitTorrent Sync.lnk and %Program 
Data%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\BitTorrent Sync.lnk, and its presence may be indicative BitTorrent Sync 
installation. 
5. Sync analysis on mobile clients 
With the growing use of mobile handheld devices, mobile client artefacts can prove an invaluable evidence source in 
digital forensics investigations (Dezfouli et al., 2015). In this section, we present the BitTorrent Sync findings on 
iPhone 4 running iOS 7.1.2 and a HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4. 
5.1 BitTorrent Sync analysis on iOS 7.1.2 
Analysis of the directory listing revealed that the iOS app installation could be discerned from the presence 
of the /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for the BitTorrent Sync iOS app]/BitTorrent 
Sync.app file. The application and storage folders (similarly to those presented for the computer applications as 
highlighted in Section 4.1) could be located at /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for the 
BitTorrent Sync iOS app]/Documents/BitTorrent Sync and /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 
 identifier for the BitTorrent Sync iOS app]/Documents/Storage respectively. Notice that the sync files/folders will 
only be downloaded when viewed in the app. Within the /private/var/mobile/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier 
for the BitTorrent Sync iOS app]/iTunesMetadata.plist file there maintains a list of mobile-specific metadata 
associated with the Symform app such as the Apple ID used to purchase the app, the purchase date, the BitTorrent 
Sync version installed. Alternatively, copies of the application and storage folders aforementioned could be located 
in /User/Applications/[Unique SHA-1 identifier for the BitTorrent Sync iOS app]/. 
Inspecting the log files, it was determined that the app installation could be distinguished from entries 
referencing ‘BitTorrent Sync’ in the /private/var/mobile/Library/Logs/MobileInstallation/mobile_installation.log.#, 
which includes the installation time. Meanwhile, the /private/var/mobile/Library/Logs/Powerlog.powerlog maintains 
a list of power and network consumption details associated with the BitTorrent Sync app; useful when seeking to 
determine the app usage pattern. An example of the log entry is as follows: 
“05/05/15 01:50:46 [Network Connections Symptoms] procName=BitTorrent Sync; 
bundleName=com.bittorent.BitTorrent-Sync; wifi-in=5461675bytes; wifi-out=1206024bytes; cell-in=435717bytes; 
cell-out=626892bytes; sinceTime=03/19/15 01:08:39” 
Undertaking uninstallation of the iOS app determined that all the files and folders of forensic interest 
aforementioned were removed, with the exception of the BitTorrent Sync entries located within the OS log files of 
relevance. 
5.2 BitTorrent Sync analysis on Android KitKat 4.4 
  The installation of the Android BitTorrent Sync app resulted in the creation of 
/data/data/com.bittorrent.sync app folder. The file of particular interest with this folder is the 
/data/data/com.bittorrent.sync/shared_prefs/preferences.xml, which keeps track of a list of paths for the shared 
folder added by or downloaded to the device under investigation in the ‘folders’ entry, a count of the number of 
times the app was run in the ‘number_of_runs’ entry, and other information of relevance. Another file of particular 
interest is the /data/data/com.bittorrent.sync/SyncStatistics.xml. Within this file there holds a list of sync statistics 
associated with the app such as the last sync time (which could be discerned from the ‘last_sent_time’ entry).  
  The application and storage folders could be located at /data/data/com.bittorrent.sync/files/.sync and 
/Home/Download/BitTorrent Sync respectively. Inspecting the directory listing, it was observed that these folders 
share the same directory structure as those presented for the computer applications (see Section 4.1), and the shared 
folders could be easily distinguished from the ‘.sync’ subfolder. Similar to the iOS app, the sync files/folders were 
only downloaded (to the storage folder) when viewed. Only the storage as well as locally added shared folders 
remained after uninstallation of the app. 
6. Network analysis 
Analysis of the network captures determined that the network traffics were encrypted (due AES-128 
encryption from the client) and the synced files were not recovered. However, we were able to recover the peer 
discovery packets that contain information of forensic interest such the IP addresses, port numbers, peer IDs, and 
share IDs associated with the host and the peers.  
Unless configured otherwise, BitTorrent Sync uses tracker servers for peer discovery by default. It was 
determined that a client utilising this peer discovery method will first send a tracker request packet to the tracker 
servers, one each for disparate share IDs, to retrieve the peer list. The tracker request packet could be discerned from 
the term ‘get_peers’ and amongst the information of forensic interest recoverable from the packet includes the local 
IP address, port number, peer ID, as well as the 20 or 32 bytes share ID for the requesting folder (see Table 7). Note 
that the act of requesting a peer lookup also serves to register the requesting client as a source (Scanlon et al., 2014). 
Upon receiving the tracker request packet from the requesting client, the tracker server will respond the requesting 
client with a tracker response packet containing a peer list which shares the same share ID (see Table 8). The tracker 
response packet will always contain at least the originating peer information and, hence, will never be empty. 
 Table 7: Details of tracker request packet of BitTorrent Sync (Information of forensic interest is bolded). 
Bencode key and value pairs Description 
µTP header type 0 µTP header type 0 which signifies regular data packet (BitTorrent Inc., 2009) 
d Start of bencode dictionary key:value pairs 
2:la Label identifier for local address 
6:[local IP:Port number] Local IP address (4 bytes) and port number (2 bytes) combination in network byte order 
2:lp Label identifier for local port number 
i[5-byte port number]e 5 bytes local port in integer format 
1:m Label identifier for message 
9:get_peers  Label identifier for ‘get_peers’ message type 
4:peer Label identifier for local peer 
20:[20-byte peer ID]  20 bytes local peer ID 
5:share Label identifier for share ID 
20:[20-byte Share ID]e OR 
32: [32 bytes share ID] 
20 or 32 bytes share ID 
 
Table 8: Details of tracker response packet of BitTorrent Sync (Information of forensic interest is bolded). 
Bencode key and value pairs Description 
µTP header type 0 µTP header type 0 which signifies regular data packet. 
00 Null 
d Start of bencode dictionary key:value pairs 
2:ea Label identifier for external address of the requesting client. 
6:[external IP:Port number of the requesting 
client]  
External IP address (4 bytes) and port number (2 bytes) combination of the 
requesting client in network byte order 
1:m: Message label identifier 
5:peers Label identifier for ‘peers’ message type 
5:peers Label identifier for ‘peers’ message type 
l Start of peer list 
d Start of bencode dictionary key:value pairs for the peer list 
1:a Label identifier for external address 
6:[external IP:Port number]  External IP address (4 bytes) and port number (2 bytes) combination of the 
corresponding peer in network byte order 
2:la Label identifier for internal address 
6:[internal/local IP:Port]  Internal IP address (4 bytes) and port number (2 bytes) combination of the 
corresponding peer in network byte order 
1:p Label identifier for peer ID 
20:[20-byte peer ID]e  Peer ID of the corresponding peer 
e End of peer list 
5:share Label identifier for share ID 
20:[20-byte share ID]e OR 
32: [32 bytes share ID] 
20 or 32 bytes share ID 
4:time:i[timestamp]e 4 bytes timestamp in integer and format (Unix epoch) 
  
When the local peer discovery method (Search LAN) was used, it was observed that the requesting client 
first broadcasted the multicast packets to the IP address 239.192.0.0:3838 for revealing its presence. The information 
of forensic interest recovered from the packets include the local port number, peer ID, and the the 20 or 32 bytes 
share IDs for the requesting folders (see Table 9). Whilst separate multicast packet was used for disparate share IDs 
in the older BitTorrent Sync version (Scanlon et al., 2014a, 2014b, 2015), it was identified that the share IDs were 
broadcasted as a list using a same multicast packet in our research. The peers receiving the multicast message 
containing the share ID(s) they possess then responded the requesting client with a multicast response packet which 
shares the same format as the multicast packet. 
Table 9: Details of multicast ping packet of BitTorrent Sync (Information of forensic interest is bolded). 
Bencode key and value pairs Description 
BSYNC BSYNC header 
00 Null 
D Start of bencode dictionary key:value pairs 
1:m Message label identifier 
4:ping Message type ‘ping’ 
4:peer Label identifier for peer 
 4:port Label identifier for local port number 
I[Port number]e Local port number in integer format 
20:[20-byte peer ID] 20 bytes local peer ID 
6:shares Label identifier for share ID 
L Start of share ID list 
20:[20-byte peer ID]e OR 
32: [32 bytes share ID]e 
20 or 32 bytes share ID 
E End of share ID list 
 
Other than inspecting the packet formats, the peer discovery methods could be discerned from the IP 
address and port number combinations maintained in the sync.conf file, which is accessible through 
http://config.usyncapp.com/sync.conf. Table 10 summarises the latest IP addresses and port numbers obtained from 
the sync.conf file downloaded in our research. Alternatively, we could also locate copies of the sync.conf file in the 
sync.log file as outlined in Table 5. Since our experiments only limited to the default peer discovery options, only 
the tracker server and local peer discovery methods were used. Comprehensive analysis of the network protocols 
used by the remaining peer discovery methods is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Table 10: IP addresses and port numbers used by BitTorrent Sync.  
Sync preferences IP address(es) Port number URL 
Use tracker server 52.0.104.4.40, 52.0.102.230, 52.1.40.103, 
52.1.1.135  
TCP and UDP port 3000 t.usyncapp.com 
Use relay server when required 67.215.231.242, 67.215.229.106 TCP and UDP port 3000 r.usyncapp.com 
Search LAN 239.192.0.0 UDP port 3838  
Automatic ports mapping over UPnP 
and NAT-PMP UDP multicast 
239.255.255.250 port 1900 UDP unicast to 
default gateway port 5351 
 
mobile_push_proxies 54.235.182.157 TCP and UDP port 3000  
7. BitTorrent Sync investigative methodology 
Based on our investigations of BitTorrent Sync, we outline a process that can be used to guide future 
forensic practitioners. In order to minimise the risk of the evidence from being questioned in court of law, it is 
imperative that the process adhere to generally accepted forensic principles, standards, guidelines, procedures and 
best practices (NIJ, 2004; Kent et al., p.5, 2006; ACPO, 2011). Mckemmish (1999), for example, defines four rules 
for digital forensics, namely minimal handing of the original, account for any changes, comply with the rules of 
evidence, and not to exceed knowledge. Similarly, the digital forensic principles of the United Kingdom Association 
of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) specify that: no action should change data, when it is necessary to access original 
data the persons accessing data should be competent to do so, a record of processes should be made, and the 
investigator in charge is responsible to ensure the principles are adhered to. Meanwhile, the NIST requires a digital 
forensics framework to support collection, examination, analysis, and reporting of (digital) evidences (Kent et al., 
2006).  
A cloud forensics framework that could provide a sound basis for compliance with the above principles is 
the cloud forensics framework of Martini and Choo (2012), since the framework is built on the digital forensics 
frameworks of McKemmish (1999) and NIST (Kent et al., 2006). Hence, similar to the approach of Quick et al. 
(2014b), we subsequently mapped the BitTorrent Sync investigation process to the framework of Martini and Choo 
(2012) to provide an operational methodology for forensic practitioners. This involves the following operation 
methodology:  
Identification and preservation 
 In the first stage, a practitioner identifies and seizes physical sources of evidence relevant to BitTorrent 
Sync investigation such as desktop computers, laptops, and mobile devices. Before attempting to preserve the data, 
it is encouraged to isolate the system from network access to avoid further human intervention. Then, a proper and 
timely preservation of the hard drive and volatile data captures using standard forensic image formats (E01, bit-for-
bit dd image, etc.) should be undertaken, as soon as practical. If physical acquisition is not possible, continue with 
the next (collection) stage. 
Collection 
Before collecting the data of relevance, the practitioner should determine whether BitTorrent Sync is 
installed on the device under investigation. This could be accomplished by determining the presence of the 
BitTorrent Sync installation directory and the pertinent entries in the OS log as well as other OS-specific files e.g., 
the registry, link, and prefetch files of Windows OS. Then, collection commences with extracting (exporting) the 
BitTorrent Sync installation, application, and sync/storage (which could be discerned from the ‘.sync’ subfolder) 
folders from the forensic image using a forensic browser. In addition, the practitioner is encouraged to carve and 
collect the files recorded within the unallocated space, RAM dump, and swap file using a data recovery software for 
supporting information. If physical acquisition is not undertaken in the previous (identification and collection) stage, 
logical acquisition should be undertaken of the files of relevance (on the device under investigation) using a live 
acquisition software and properly preserved in a logical container such as L01, AD1, or CTR format. The collection 
should also include OS-specific and web browser files of forensic interest such as $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, 
prefetch files, thumbnail cache, link files, log files, as well as other files as highlighted in Section 4. 
 
Examination and analysis 
In this stage, the practitioner examines the collected files. Both indexed and non-indexed as well as 
Unicode and non-Unicode string search should be included as part of the keyword search. The analysis involves the 
following steps: 
1. Analyse the settings.dat and sync.dat files to determine the BitTorrent Sync installation time, peer ID, and 
device name of the device under investigation. 
2. Next, analyse the ‘identity’ and ‘identities’ entries of the sync.dat file to determine the identity names of the 
device under investigation and the associated peer devices.  
3. Analyse the ‘access_request’ entry of the sync.dat file to obtain the identities which sent folder access requests 
to the device under investigation as well as the IP addresses, folder IDs, request times, and request permission 
types.  
4. Analyse the ‘folder’ entry of the sync.dat file to determine the folder IDs, folder names, last added and modified 
times, as well as the paths for the shared folders added by or downloaded to the device under investigation. 
5. Map the information obtained in step 4 to the physical copies of the shared folders to determine the share ID 
(from the ‘ID’ file stored within the ‘.sync’ subfolder), sync filenames or folder names (including the 
filenames/folder names for the deleted files/folders resided in the archive folder), as well as the timestamp 
information associated with each shared folder.  
6. Match the share ID(s) obtained in step 5 with the [share-ID].db database in the application folder to determine 
the filenames or folder names associated with each share. 
7. Match the synced filenames or folder names determined in step 5 with the history.dat file (or the history.dat 
entries recorded in sync.log) to determine the device names associated with a particular synced filename or 
folder name. 
8. Correlate the folder IDs obtained in step 4 with the folder IDs located in /%BitTorrent 
Sync%/SyncUser<Random number>/devices/[Base32-encoded Peer ID]/folders/ to determine the shared 
folders associated with a specific peer ID.  
9. Correlate the folder IDs obtained in step 4 with the ‘getsyncfolders’ API response entries in sync.log to obtain 
additional information pertinent to the shared folders (e.g., the fingerprints of the associated peers). 
10. Examine the ‘peers’ subentry of the ‘folders’ entry (of the sync.dat file) to locate supporting information 
relating to the peers associated with the shared folders added by or downloaded to the device under 
investigation such as the last used IP addresses, last sync times, last seen times, and last data transfer times.  
11. Correlate the device names obtained in step 7 with the log entries to identify the non-encoded peer IDs as well 
as identity-specific fingerprints.  
12. Inspect the last modified time of each synced folder/file to determine if the files have been modified offline. If 
changes made are relevant to the investigation, remote synchronisation would assist in determining the changes 
 made. 
13. Once the peer IDs, device names, fingerprints, shared folders, share IDs, folder IDs, and other information of 
relevance are located, additional analysis can be undertaken on the OS-specific system and log files, web 
browsing information, carved files, memory files, network captures, and other evidence sources to provide 
supporting information or recover deleted data.  
14. Iterate the framework with evidence source identification and preservation via the associated peer devices using 
the peer information (e.g., IP addresses) obtained. 
 
 
Presentation 
Merge the information gathered during the analysis phase into a report. This comprises:  
1. The BitTorrent Sync version(s) installed on the device(s) investigated as well as the installation time(s). 
2. The non-encoded peer IDs, device names, fingerprints, and IP addresses of the device(s) investigated as 
well as the associated peers. 
3. The folder names, IDs, as well as timestamp information for the shared folders located in the device(s) 
investigated. 
4. The peers which sent folder access requests to the device(s) investigated alongside the shared folder IDs, 
folder names, and timestamp information associated with the requests.  
5. The peers associated with the share IDs or shared folders investigated. 
6. Copies of the sync files as well as the timestamp information associated with the share IDs or shared 
folders investigated. 
8. Conclusion and future work 
Without the use of systematic investigative procedures and techniques, crucial evidence may be missed in 
an investigation and the integrity of the evidence would be compromised. In this paper, we investigated the artefacts 
from the use of BitTorrent Sync on computer and mobile devices running Window 8.1, Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, Mac 
OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, iOS 7.1.2, and Android KitKat 4.4.4. We then outlined an operational methodology with 
the view to provide a systematic approach for collecting and analysis of evidence relating to BitTorrent Sync. 
Analyses of the directory listings revealed that the that the process of uploading, storage, and downloading 
files from/to the shared folders did not change the MD5 and SHA1 hash values, indicating the viability evidence 
collection through remote synchronisation. The synced files that were deleted could be forensically recovered from 
the peer device’s ‘Archive’ subfolder as well as the non-emptied trash or recycle bin folder of the device which 
initiated the file deletion. In addition to directory listing, we were able to recover evidence of BitTorrent Sync usage 
from the log and metadata files such as settings.dat, sync.dat, history.dat, sync.log, and [share-ID].db located in the 
application folder. These files remained intact even after we unlinked the identity, with the exception of those 
located in the identity-specific /%BitTorrent Sync%/.SyncUser<Random number> subfolder. Alternatively, it was 
identified that copies of the log and metadata files could be potentially recovered from memory files and unallocated 
space intact or in plain text, provided that the remnants are not cleared or flushed. 
Analyses of the network captures determined that the network traffics were encrypted and the synced file 
remnants were not recovered. However, we were able to recover the peer discovery packets which contain 
information of forensic interest such the IP addresses, port numbers, peer IDs, and share IDs associated with the host 
and the peers. 
Our examinations of the physical memory captures indicated that the memory dump can provide potential 
for alternative methods for recovering the login credentials and log and metadata files of forensic interest in plain 
text. The memory dump could also provide an alternative method for recovering the running process and network 
information using the ‘pslist’ and ‘netscan’/’netstat’ functions of Volatility. The PIDs could assist the investigator in 
obtaining data associated with the Symform client application during further analysis of the physical memory dumps 
(i.e., locating the data remnants associated with the process using the Yarascan function of Volatility). The presence 
of the artefacts in the memory dump also means the artefacts could be potentially located in the swap files as a result 
of inactive memory pages being swapped out of the memory to the hard disk during the system’s normal operation 
(Quick and Choo, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Yang et al., 2016). Nevertheless, a practitioner must keep in mind that 
 memory changes frequently according to users’ activities and will be wiped as soon as the system is shut down. 
Hence, obtaining a memory snapshot of a compromised system as quickly as possible increases the likelihood of 
preserving the artefacts before being overwritten in memory.  
A summary of findings from our research is shown in Table 11. To keep pace with technological advances, 
future work would include extending this research to other popular private cloud services (Syncany, Seafile, etc.) 
that can be used to inform IoT investigations.
 Table 11: Summary of findings (R =Recoverable, P = Possibly Recoverable, N = Not Recoverable). 
Platform Source of Evidence Data artefacts found   
Installation, uninstallation, and 
BitTorrent Sync usage information 
 
Peer device 
names/ IP 
addresses 
Enron sample 
files/ path 
references 
File-sharing 
Key 
Share ID Peer ID Fingerprint 
Windows 8.1 Directory listings R R R R R R R 
Registry R N P N N N N 
System logs R N, only found 
in sync.log 
N, only found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
 Prefetch R N N N N N N 
Thumbcache files P N P, synced image N N N N 
Link files R N N N N N N 
RAM P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Pagefile.sys P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Unallocated space P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Ubuntu 
14.04.1 LTS 
Directory listings/Stored files R R R R R R R 
System logs N, only found in sync.log N, only found 
in sync.log 
N, only found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
 Thumbcache files N N N N N N N 
RAM P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Swap partition P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Unallocated space P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Mac OS X 
Mavericks 
10.9.5 
Directory listings/Stored files R R R R R R R 
System logs R N, only found 
in sync.log 
N, only found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
 Thumbcache files R N R N N N N 
RAM P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Swap partition P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
Unallocated space P, including the log and metadata files P P P P P P 
iOS 7.1.2 Directory listings/Stored files R R R R R R R 
System logs  R N, only found 
in sync.log 
N, only found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
Android 
Kitkat 4.4.4 
Directory listings/Stored files R R R R R R R 
System logs N N, only found 
in sync.log 
N, only found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
N, only 
found in 
sync.log 
Network capture R R N R R R N 
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